How Nabiullina, Kostin and Potanin robbed the middle class

Investigation into the main financial scam - PAO "SPB Exchange". Part 1



"Nobody is guilty of anything." Roman Goryunov. Director of PAO "SPB Exchange" It is this quote from Goryunov that best characterizes in a satirical key the narratives of the financial regulator of the Russian Federation regarding the most grandiose financial scam in the Russian Federation since the robbery of the people by Sberbank of the USSR. Details - on the telegram channel VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info.

The history of the Russian stock exchange since the transition to a market economy goes back many years, but the financial market really turned around at full capacity in 2021 not only as a result of massive advertising by opinion leaders from Ksenia Sobchak to Artemy Lebedev, loyal info-guardians of any Kremlin policy, but also because on October 21, 2021, the director of the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange Roman Goryunov happily announced direct access to the New York Stock Exchange (hereinafter NYSE) through the custodian bank Bank of New York Mellon (hereinafter BONY), which made it possible to reduce the commission for buying and selling securities to negligible ones.

Despite the fact that not a single financial institution in the Russian Federation had direct access to DTC (the US central depository), and was forced to use the services of several intermediaries, entering the NYSE was actually a breakthrough in terms of access to a huge list of securities and low commissions. The only problem is that the rather low financial literacy of private investors, who were driven to the stock exchange in droves by the above-mentioned influencers, did not allow millions of people to assess the risks. Even if we ignore the risk, which turned out to be the most important and least expected, which will be discussed below, there was not enough literacy even to get enough information about BONY itself, which was associated with many scandals that gave rise to the status of a huge gray bank, and about the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange, not a single annual report of which was audited by the audit company of the Big 4 group. Therefore, this whole deal initially smelled good only for those who made millions on advertising stock markets in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, 2021 brought huge profits to all securities traders due to the post-pandemic growth of the main US stock indices. Trouble awaited the investor in February 2022 with the start of the so-called special military operation of Russian President Putin. As early as 24.02.2022, full blocking sanctions were imposed on major Russian banks, including VTB Bank, Promsvyazbank and VEB RF. But further we will talk about VTB and Tinkoff banks, since it was their clients who were either completely deprived of access to their assets or were the most numerous victims. As can be seen from the text of the statements of claim in lawsuits with VTB Bank (PJSC), after the introduction of sanctions, VTB Bank (PJSC) had 30 days (from 24.02.2022 to 26.03.2022) to complete all financial transactions, including granting investors the right to sell their foreign securities. However, VTB Bank forcibly closed the opportunity to sell for its clients, citing technical problems from March 1, 2022. Later, VTB Bank sent an information message entitled "Movement of securities for the period from 24.02.2022 to 25.03.2022", which stated that the securities were transferred to the following Counterparty Banks: Alfa Bank JSC and Rosselkhozbank JSC. Brokerage service agreements were automatically concluded with Alfa Bank JSC and Rosselkhozbank JSC without the consent of VTB clients, and the securities owned by right were placed on an over-the-counter ("non-trading") account (section) of third-party banks. (In violation of clause 4.8.4. of the Terms of Depository Activities of VTB Bank PJSC.) It is worth highlighting that we are talking about shares of American companies listed on the NYSE and purchased through the St. Petersburg Exchange, against which no sanctions were imposed until November 2023. These actions to transfer the assets of VTB PJSC were carried out in accordance with the Decision of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation dated March 18, 2022, which was motivated by the blocking of assets of sanctioned brokers in Euroclear (the date miraculously coincides with the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation, and if we follow the symbolism, then, apparently, the Russian government hinted at the need to pay for the banquet at the expense of the personal funds of the middle class of the Russian Federation)

And then began three long years of endless lies from the head and employees of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

We should start with how the Russian stock exchange is structured. There is the Moscow Exchange, where Russian securities are traded, derivatives and debt obligations in euros were traded, as well as foreign securities in ruble valuation. Its activities are supported by the clearing center of the JSCB NCC and its central depository NCO JSC NSD. There is also PAO SPB Exchange, which traded foreign securities in US dollars through direct access to the NYSE. PAO SPB Exchange had a clearing center, OJSC "CC MFB", renamed in June 2022 to NCO CK "SPB Clearing" and a depository, PAO "Best Efforts Bank", renamed in June 2022 to PAO SPB Bank. The sanctions imposed on a broker, for example, VTB, should not have had immediate consequences for its clients, since VTB itself did not have direct contractual relations with European depositories. Contractual relations with the depositories Euroclear and Clearstream were held by the structures of the Moscow Exchange, that is, a depository of a higher order than the VTB depository, namely NSD. This is evident, among other things, from the court cases of Russian banks against Euroclear, for example, the court case of Bank Saint Petersburg, where both NSD and Euroclear were defendants, simply because the Eurobonds that were the subject of the claim were stored in Euroclear through NSD depository accounts. And until the EU Ministry of Finance imposed sanctions on NCO JSC NSD, which happened only on June 3, 2022, nothing prevented VTB Bank from closing its positions on the Moscow and Saint Petersburg Exchanges. It is also worth noting the fact that not a single court case of Russian banks against Euroclear, either in the Russian Federation or in the EU jurisdiction, which can also be found in the registers of court cases of the Russian Federation against Euroclear, concerned any shares, especially those trading on the NYSE. Each such claim dealt exclusively with Eurobonds blocked in EU structures, which indirectly confirms the general falsity of the statements of both brokers and the head of the Central Bank that the American shares of VTB clients blocked in the structures of the St. Petersburg Exchange were blocked in the Euroclear circuit, which they have repeatedly voiced. The exchange itself, obeying the sanctioning authorities, had to withdraw the assets of sanctioned banks from the pool and not have relations with them, so as not to fall under secondary sanctions. And in this case, VTB actually had to either allow clients to sell their shares and forcibly close margin positions (customers' purchase of securities using a broker's loan), or transfer the assets of clients to another unsanctioned broker. The first option is better because it excludes contractual relations between a sanctioned broker and a non-sanctioned one. Clients sold - clients are not under sanctions, no one violated anything. Therefore, Sovcombank acted exactly this way, setting deadlines for its clients for the mandatory sale of all assets.

When transferring, the new broker had to replenish the special account of the Clearing Company of the Joint Venture Exchange with the amount of funds/shares received from VTB and place securities of new clients in its depositories for depository accounting (trading and depository accounts), having checked the absence of sanctions for such new clients, the so-called compliance. But judging by the fact that the new broker placed VTB assets on off-balance sheet non-trading accounts, on which the share valuation is approximately $ 0.01, he did not receive any financial security/liquidity from VTB. This was a transfer of the register of digital rights of clients who no longer had material value from the off-balance sheet account of VTB to the off-balance sheet account of the new broker. The assets of VTB clients were simply zeroed out. It is no coincidence that the attached agreement on the transfer of assets between VTB and Alfa-Bank does not include any figures, as well as the amounts of remuneration for the transaction. Of course, there are additional agreements to them, which neither Kostin nor Fridman will ever show to anyone, even in court!

These dubious operations began to be accompanied by information noise with the emergence of a kind of financial newspeak, which did not appear in any regulatory act of the Russian Federation. Namely, "internal pool", "untagged assets", "seamless transfer", "non-trading accounts". That is, too much vocabulary appeared in the everyday life of the financial regulator, which is not provided for by any legislative act of the Russian Federation in this area. The factor of constraint and the boundaries of what is permissible disappeared in an instant, like a mask falls from a face.

The decision of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation dated 18.03.22 on the careful transfer of financial assets of citizens of the Russian Federation from an unknown place to an unknown place was naturally not the last, but only the first of three.





Tatyana Skorikova

To be continued

Source: www.rucriminal.info

Как Набиуллина, Костин и Потанин средний класс грабили

Расследование о главной финансовой афере – ПАО «СПБ Биржа» . Часть 1



«Никто ни в чем не виноват». Роман Горюнов. Директор ПАО «СПБ Биржа» Именно эта цитата Горюнова как ни что лучше характеризует в сатирическом ключе нарративы финансового регулятора РФ в отношении самой грандиозной финансовой аферы в РФ со времен ограбления народа Сбербанком СССР. Подробности – у телеграм-канала ВЧК-ОГПУ и Rucriminal.info.

История российской биржи со времен перехода к рыночной экономике насчитывает уже немало лет, но по настоящему финансовый рынок развернулся на полную мощность в 2021 году не только в следствие массированной рекламы лидерами мнений от Ксении Собчак до Артемия Лебедева, верных инфо-стражей любой политики Кремля, но и по причине того, что 21 октября 2021 года директор Санкт-петербургской биржи Роман Горюнов радостно объявил о прямом доступе на Нью-Йоркскую фондовую биржу (далее NYSE) через банк-кастодиан Bank of New York Mellon (далее BONY), что позволяло снизить комиссию при покупке и продаже ценных бумаг до мизерных.



При том, что ни один финансовый институт РФ не имел прямого доступа к DTC (центральному депозитарию США), и вынужден был пользоваться услугами нескольких посредников, выход на NYSE на самом деле был прорывом в части доступа к огромному перечню бумаг и низким комиссиям. Беда лишь в том, что достаточно низкая финансовая грамотность частных инвесторов, которых стаями на биржу загоняли выше упомянутые инфлюэнсеры, не позволила миллионам людей оценить риски. Даже если проигнорировать риск, который оказался самым главным и менее всего ожидаемым, о котором речь пойдет ниже, грамотности не хватило даже на то, чтобы получить достаточно информации как о самом BONY, с которым было связано немало скандалов, породивших статус огромного серого банка, так и о Санкт-Петербургской бирже, ни один годовой отчет которой не был проверен аудиторской компанией группы Big 4. Поэтому весь этот гешефт изначально пах хорошо разве что для тех, кто зарабатывал миллионы на рекламе фондовых рынков в РФ.

Тем не менее, 2021 год принес огромные прибыли всем трейдерам ценными бумагами по причине постпандемийного роста основных биржевых индексов США. Беда же поджидала инвестора в феврале 2022 года с началом так называемой специальной военной операции президента РФ Путина.

Уже 24.02.2022 года на крупные банки РФ были наложены полные блокирующие санкции, включая Банк ВТБ, Промсвязьбанк и ВЭБ РФ. Но далее речь пойдет о банках ВТБ и Тинькофф, так как именно их клиенты оказались либо полностью лишенными доступа к своим активам, либо самыми многочисленными пострадавшими.

Как видно из текста исковых заявлений по судебным процессам с Банком ВТБ (ПАО) после введения санкций у Банка ВТБ (ПАО) было 30 дней (с 24.02.2022 до 26.03.2022) на завершение всех финансовых операций, в т.ч. предоставить право инвесторам продать свои иностранные ценные бумаги. Однако банк ВТБ принудительно закрыл для своих клиентов возможность продажи, ссылаясь на технические проблемы с 1го марта 2022 года. Позже Банк ВТБ прислал информационное сообщение под названием «Движение ценных бумаг за период с 24.02.2022 по 25.03.2022, где сказано, что ценные бумаги были переведены в следующие Банки-Контрагенты: АО «Альфа Банк» и АО «Россельхозбанк».

С АО «Альфа-Банк» и АО «Россельхозбанк» автоматически были заключены соглашения на брокерское обслуживание без согласия клиентов ВТБ, а принадлежащие на праве собственности ценные бумаги размещены на внебиржевом ("неторговом") счету (разделе) сторонних банков. (В нарушение п.4.8.4. Условий осуществления депозитарной деятельности банка ПАО ВТБ.) Тут стоит выделить то, что речь идет об акциях американских компаний, вращающихся на NYSE и купленных через СПБ биржу, против которой санкций до ноября 2023 года никто не вводил.

Данные действия по переводу активов ПАО "ВТБ" осуществлялись согласно Решения Совета Директоров Центрального Банка РФ от 18.03.2022г, которое мотивировалось блокировкой активов подсанкционных брокеров в Евроклир (дата дивным образом совпадает с годовщиной присоединения Крыма к Российской Федерации, и если следовать символизму, то, видимо, правительство РФ намекнуло на необходимость оплатить банкет за счет личных средств среднего класса РФ)

А далее начались долгих три года нескончаемой лжи главы и сотрудников Центрального Банка Российской Федерации.

Начать следует с того, как устроена российская биржа. Есть Московская биржа, где производятся торги российскими ценными бумагами, производились торги производными и долговыми обязательствами в евро, а также иностранными ценными бумагами в рублевой стоимостной оценке. Ее деятельность сопровождает клиринговый центр АКБ НКЦ и ее центральный депозитарий НКО АО НРД. Есть и ПАО СПБ Биржа, осуществлявшая торги иностранными ценными бумагами в долларах США через прямой доступ на NYSE. ПАО СПБ Биржа имела клиринговый центр ОАО «КЦ МФБ», переименованный в июне 2022 в НКО ЦК «СПБ Клиринг» и депозитарий ПАО «Бэст Эффортс Банк», переименованный в июне 2022 года в ПАО «СПБ Банк». Санкции, наложенные на брокера, к примеру на ВТБ, не должны были создать мгновенных последствий для его клиентов, так как сам ВТБ не имел прямых договорных отношений с европейскими депозитариями. Договорные отношения с депозитариями Евроклир и Клирстрим имели структуры Московской биржи, то есть депозитарий более высокого порядка, чем депозитарий ВТБ, а именно НРД. Это видно в том числе по судам российских банков против Евроклир, например суд Банка Санкт-Петербург, где ответчиками выступали и НРД и Евроклир, просто потому что евробонды, которые были предметом иска, хранились в Евроклире через депозитарные счета НРД. И пока Минфин ЕС не наложил санкции на НКО АО НРД, что произошло только 3 июня 2022 года, ничто не мешало банку ВТБ закрыть свои позиции на Московской и Петербургской бирже. Также стоит отметить факт того, что ни один суд российских банков против Евроклир как в РФ, так и в юрисдикции ЕС, с которыми тоже можно ознакомиться в реестрах судебных дел РФ против Евроклир, не касался каких-либо акций, тем более вращающихся на NYSE. В каждом таком иске речь шла исключительно о заблокированных в структурах ЕС евробондах, что косвенно подтверждает общую лживость заявлений как брокеров, так и главы ЦБ о том, что заблокированные в структурах СПБ Биржи американские акции клиентов ВТБ были заблокированы в контуре Евроклир, что они неоднократно озвучивали.

Сама биржа, подчиняясь санкционирующим органам, должна была вывести из пула активы подсанкционных банков и не иметь с ними отношений, чтоб не попасть под вторичные санкции. И в этом случае ВТБ на самом деле должен был либо позволить клиентам продать свои акции и принудительно закрыть маржинальные позиции (покупка клиентами бумаг за счет кредита брокера), либо передать активы клиентов другому неподсанкционному брокеру. Первый вариант лучше, потому что исключает договорные отношения подсанкционного брокера с неподсанкционным. Клиенты продали- клиенты не под санкциями, никто ничего не нарушил. Поэтому Совкомбанк поступил именно так, установив своим клиентам сроки обязательной продажи всех активов.

При переводе новый брокер должен был на сумму полученных от ВТБ денежных средств/акций пополнить спец.счет Клиринговой компании СП Биржи и поставить в ее депозитарии ценные бумаги новых клиентов на депозитарный учет (торговые и депозитарные счета), проведя проверку отсутствия подсанкционности у таких новых клиентов, так называемый комплайенс. Но судя по тому, что новый брокер поставил активы ВТБ на забалансовые неторговые счета, на которых оценка акции равна примерно 0,01доллару никакого финансового обеспечения/ликвидности от ВТБ он не получил. Это был перевод реестра цифровых прав клиентов уже не имеющих материальной стоимости с забалансового счета ВТБ на забалансовый счет нового брокера. Активы клиентов ВТБ были просто обнулены. В прилагаемом соглашении на перевод активов между ВТБ и Альфа-Банком неслучайно не фигурируют какие-либо цифры, равно как и суммы вознаграждения по сделке. К ним, конечно, есть доп. соглашения, которые ни Костин ни Фридман никому и никогда не покажут даже в судах!



Эти сомнительные операции начали сопровождаться информационным шумом с возникновением своеобразного финансового новояза, который не фигурировал ни в одном нормативном акте РФ. А именно «внутренний пул», «немаркированные активы», «бесшовный перевод», «неторговые счета». То есть в обиходе финансового регулятора появилось слишком много лексики, которая не предусмотрена ни одним законодательным актом РФ в данной сфере. Фактор стеснения и границы допустимого исчезли просто в миг, как падает маска с лица.

Решение Совета директоров ЦБ РФ от 18.03.22г о бережном переводе финансовых активов граждан РФ из непонятно откуда в непонятно куда естественно было не последним, а лишь первым из трех.





Татьяна Скорикова

Продолжение следует

Источник: www.rucriminal.info

A Bullet in the Head for the Deputy Chief of the Federal Penitentiary Service

Suicide or Murder?

As reported by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, on April 25, 2025, Igor Andreevich Rozhnev, Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Krasnoyarsk Territory, died in his own garage. The cause of death was a gunshot to the head, which was considered suicide. However, this information raises doubts, and questions remain open.



A possible reason for the suicide (or its staging) was the investigation of fraud at Rozhnev's previous place of work, when he held the position of Chief of the Federal Penitentiary Service Correctional Institution No. 24 of the Main Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Recently, a new chief was appointed to this position, who, apparently under pressure from the Internal Security Directorate, began to study the institution's documents in depth. During the investigation, shortcomings and forgeries of documents were discovered. According to some reports, the Internal Security Directorate had long known about corruption in this institution, but for some reason did nothing. There is currently no information regarding what exactly prompted the inspection, but judging by the situation, it is related to the illegal trade in timber and metal.

According to a source at Rucriminal.info, why the head of the Main Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Krasnoyarsk Territory, A. A. Efarkin, took Rozhnev to this position remains a mystery.




With the arrival of A. A. Efarkin to the position of head of the Main Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Krasnoyarsk Territory, dramatic changes occurred - almost all deputies were replaced. Mass layoffs of employees and problems with wages (while Efarkin himself promised to raise them in the fall of 2024) became the main reasons for the outflow of personnel. There is a huge personnel shortage in this region, despite the fact that several correctional institutions have simply been mothballed (such as IK-16, IK-7, several KPs). This leads to the conclusion that Efarkin's leadership has destroyed the Main Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and at the moment this is not the end of the crisis.

Also, according to the interlocutor, it is worth paying attention to one more detail: Efarkin's brother A.A. works in the FSB of Krasnoyarsk Krai, which may cast doubt on the objectivity of the authorities' actions regarding the investigation of this situation. This circumstance increases suspicions about possible corruption ties and manipulations aimed at concealing the facts.

There are several controversial points in the situation with Rozhnev. Firstly, the very fact of appointing a person with a dubious track record to the post of deputy head of the GUFSIN raises questions about the motives for this appointment. Perhaps Efarkin was forced to take Rozhnev for some hidden reasons that are unknown to the general public.




Secondly, the investigation process itself in IK-24 looks unconvincing. The disappearance of timber, which used to be the main source of income, raises questions about possible financial fraud and corruption. This may indicate more complex schemes involving several levels of management. In addition, the version of possible persecution by the FSB and participation in corruption schemes makes the situation even more confusing. Perhaps Rozhnev's death is not just a tragic event, but also an attempt to hide more serious crimes.

Perhaps the situation requires a deeper and independent investigation to establish all the circumstances and find out whether Rozhnev's death was really a suicide or a staging.

Arseniy Dronov

Source: www.rucriminal.info

Пуля в голову для замначальника УФСИН

Суицид или убийство?

Как сообщил телеграм-канал ВЧК-ОГПУ, 25 апреля 2025 года в своём собственном гараже скончался Рожнёв Игорь Андреевич, заместитель начальника ГУФСИН России по Красноярскому краю. Причина смерти – выстрел в голову, что было расценено как самоубийство. Однако эта информация вызывает сомнения, и вопросы остаются открытыми.

Возможным поводом для самоубийства (или его инсценировки) стали расследования махинаций на прошлом месте работы Рожнёва, когда он занимал должность начальника ФКУ ИК-24 ГУФСИН России по Красноярскому краю. Недавно на эту должность был назначен новый начальник, который, видимо, под давлением УСБ начал углублённо изучать документы учреждения. В ходе расследования обнаружились недочёты, подлоги документов. По некоторым данным УСБ давно знало о коррупции в данном учреждении, но по каким-то причинам бездействовало. Информации касательно того что именно послужило поводом проверки на данный момент нет, но судя по ситуации это связанно с нелегальной торговлей древесины и металла.

По мнению источника Rucriminal.info, почему начальник ГУФСИН России по Красноярскому краю Ефаркин А.А. взял Рожнева на эту должность – остаётся загадкой.



С приходом Ефаркина А.А. на должность начальника ГУФСИН России по Красноярскому краю произошли кардинальные изменения - практически все заместители были заменены. Массовые увольнения сотрудников и проблемы с заработной платой (при этом сам Ефаркин осенью 2024 года обещал её повышение) стали основными причинами оттока кадров. В данном регионе огромный кадровый голод, при том что несколько ИУ просто законсервировали (Такие как ИК-16, ИК-7, несколько КП). Это приводит к выводам о том, что руководство Ефаркина развалило ГУФСИН России по Красноярскому краю, и на данный момент это ещё не конец кризиса.

Также, по мнению собеседника, стоит обратить внимание на ещё одну деталь: родной брат Ефаркина А.А. работает в ФСБ Красноярского края, что может ставить под сомнение объективность действий властей в отношении расследования этой ситуации. Это обстоятельство усиливает подозрения о возможных коррупционных связях и манипуляциях, направленных на скрытие фактов.

В ситуации с Рожнёвым есть несколько спорных моментов. Во-первых, сам факт назначения на должность заместителя начальника ГУФСИН человека с сомнительным послужным списком вызывает вопросы о мотивах этого назначения. Возможно, Ефаркин был вынужден взять Рожнёва по каким-то скрытым причинам, о которых неизвестно широкой аудитории.



Во-вторых, сам процесс расследования в ИК-24 выглядит неубедительно. Пропажа леса, который раньше был основным источником прибыли, вызывает вопросы о возможных финансовых махинациях и коррупции. Это может указывать на более сложные схемы, вовлекающие несколько уровней управления.

Кроме того, версия о возможном преследовании со стороны ФСБ и участии в коррупционных схемах делает ситуацию ещё более запутанной. Возможно, смерть Рожнёва является не просто трагическим событием, но и попыткой скрыть более серьёзные преступления.

Возможно, ситуация требует более глубокого и независимого расследования, чтобы установить все обстоятельства и выяснить, была ли смерть Рожнёва действительно самоубийством или же инсценировкой.

Арсений Дронов

Источник: www.rucriminal.info

The path of the fixer. Part two

How the Bitayev clan, close to the leadership of the FSB of the Russian Federation, is organized



The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info continue to talk about the number one fixer at the FSB, Valery Bitayev, who is essentially openly trading the highest-ranking security officials, including the first deputy director of the FSB of the Russian Federation. Few can afford his services, for example, his main client, the oligarch Alisher Usmanov. The former military man (a graduate of the Frunze Academy, a participant in the war in Angola, was a fixer back under Serdyukov), official (headed the Volgograd Region representative office in Moscow) and businessman (holder of shares in the security forces) is preparing his replacement in the person of his son. And, despite the revelations, he remains at the center of corruption flows between people with money and people with power. Much has been said about Valery Bitayev's connections with the first deputy head of the FSB and at the same time the main contender for the post of director of the special service, Sergei Korolev. Including in the early posts of the VChK-OGPU. The "take-off" of the fixer coincided with the general's rise in service: after they met (different sources cite the period of Korolev's service in the Ministry of Defense), Bitayev acquired a mansion on the 2nd line of Serebryany Bor, where the neighbors are only billionaires, security officials and their relatives at the level of heads of federal departments. One of Bitayev's latest "projects" is the withdrawal from the criminal case of Viktor Lagvinets, a former friend and business partner of the former dollar billionaire and owner of the Yugra bank and a number of oil assets, including the Dulisma company, Alexei Khotin. According to a source of the VChK-OGPU, in addition to handing over assets and going under the "roof" of the FSB, the latter paid 11 billion (!) rubles to the treasury alone as compensation for damages. Among other things, the wife of the main "fixer" Galina Bitaeva became the owner of at least two more apartments in prestigious areas of Moscow. And most of the cars that were registered to her were insured in the name of a certain Alexey Linetsky. He is on the list of United Russia candidates for the State Duma from the Volgograd Region, which was headed at that time by Viktor Zubkov (according to colleagues from "Important Stories", Sergei Korolev owes his career to him).

As for the change in the field of solving problems, Valery Bitaev had two projects on this account: his own children Zalina Bitaeva and Valery Bitaev Jr.

The fixer's daughter had a successful career in the Arbitration Court of Moscow for a time. As "Important Stories" wrote, Zalina Bitaeva received the robe about twice as fast as other clerks (the appointment to the position was in 2012 by presidential decree), but since 2020 her name has disappeared from the court's website. The disappearance coincided with a criminal case involving the secretary of the Arbitration Court, who allegedly used the seal of Judge Bitaeva in the dark. However, it is difficult to say that the daughter of the main "fixer" went on the run or emigrated. In any case, that this happened immediately after the scandal in court. The leaks contain information that Zalina Bitaeva had regular GSM connections with her mother, dentist, security in Serebryany Bor and other subscribers until 2024. As for the son of the main "fixer", he grew up in "hothouse conditions" and did not grab the stars from the sky. Until his father put "cases" with the FSB on stream. The Internet has preserved profiles of Valery Bitaev Jr. from dating sites. He described himself as a man of average build with brown hair and tattoos. "Valera" wrote that he was looking for a girl from 18 to 27 years old for friendship and to start a family. In the photographs, he posed with a shot glass in his hands: the passions of youth, according to acquaintances, unfortunately, developed into problems with alcohol in adulthood. Until 2012, Valery Bitayev Jr. was listed in JSC "Resorts of the North Caucasus", and when his father's business went uphill, he headed "RT-MedIntegrator". The company was engaged in the purchase of Philips tomographs for Russian clinics. Thus, Valery Bitayev began to work with Rostec (the company had a direct relationship with the state corporation) and personally with Sergei Chemezov, through his protege Andrei Shepilov. Around this time, the son of the main fixer married Tatyana, née Berezhnaya. At that time, she was already older than Valery stated in his profile - 27 years old, but her age and background did not become an obstacle to marriage.

The woman worked in the supply department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then in the tax office. She was married to a certain Vasily Gorbunov, apparently a creative person. In different sources, he appears differently: sometimes as "Vasily Philharmonic", sometimes as "Vasily Producer", and in one place even as a courier for a popular delivery service. They have a daughter, but Valery Bitayev accepted Tatyana with her child from her first marriage as his own, and even gave both of them his last name.

Subsequently, Tatyana and Valery had children together, and the woman radically changed her lifestyle. She stopped working, formally got a job at the company "New Technologies", where her husband and all their entourage until recently received a salary, and Bitaeva's subscriptions were exclusively "plastic", "Bali" and "18+".

Timofey Grishin

To be continued

Source: www.rucriminal.info

Путь решалы. Часть два

Как устроен клан Битаевых, близкий к руководству ФСБ РФ



Телеграм-канал ВЧК-ОГПУ и Rucriminal.info продолжают рассказывать о решале номер один при ФСБ Валерии Битаеве, который фактически в открытую ведет торговлю самыми высокопоставленными силовиками, включая первого замдиректора ФСБ РФ. Его услуги мало кому по карману, например, главный его клиент олигарх Алишер Усманов. Бывший военный (выпускник Академии Фрунзе, участник войны в Анголе, был решалой еще при Сердюкове), чиновник (возглавлял представительство Волгоградской области в Москве) и бизнесмен (держатель долей силовиков) готовит себе смену в лице сына. И, несмотря на разоблачения, остаётся в центре коррупционных потоков между людьми с деньгами и людьми с властью.



О связях Валерия Битаева с первым замглавы ФСБ и одновременно главным претендентом в кресло директора спецслужбы Сергеем Королевым, было сказано немало. В том числе в ранних постах ВЧК-ОГПУ. «Взлёт» решалы совпал с ростом по службе генерала: после их знакомства (разные источники называют период службы Королева в Минобороны) у Битаева появился особняк на 2-й линии Серебряного Бора, где по соседству только миллиардеры, силовики и их родственники уровня глав федеральных ведомств.



Один из последних «проектов» Битаева — это вывод из уголовного дела бывшего друг и делового партнёра в прошлом долларового миллиардера и владельца банка «Югра» и ряда нефтяных активов, в том числе и компании «Дулисьма» Алексея Хотина — Виктора Лагвинца. По данным источника ВЧК-ОГПУ, помимо сдачи активов, перехода под «крышу» ФСБ, последний выплатил только в казну сумму в 11 миллиардов (!) рублей в качестве возмещения ущерба.



Помимо прочего, жена главного «решалы» Галина Битаева стала хозяйкой ещё как минимум двух квартир в престижных районах Москвы. А большинство автомобилей, которые были зарегистрированы на неё застрахованы от имени некого Алексея Линецкого. Он встречается в списке кандидатов-единороссов в ГосДуму от Волгоградской области, который в те годы возглавлял Виктор Зубков (по данным коллег из «Важных историй» ему своей карьерой обязан Сергей Королев).



Что касается смены на ниве решения вопросов, то у Валерия Битаева на этот счёт было два проекта: его родные дети Залина Битаева и Валерий Битаев младший.

Дочь решалы имела успешную до поры до времени карьеру в Арбитражном суде Москвы. Как писали «Важные истории», Залина Битаева примерно вдвое быстрее других клерков заполучила мантию (назначение на должность было в 2012 году Указом президента), но с 2020 года её имя пропало с сайта суда.



Исчезновение совпало с уголовным делом, где фигурировал секретарь АС, который использовал печать судьи Битаевой, якобы втёмную.

Однако, говорить о том, что дочь главного «решалы» подалась в бега или эмигрировала сложно. Во всяком случае, что это случилось сразу после скандала в суде. В утечках фигурируют данные о том, что Залина Битаева имела регулярные соединения по GSM связи с матерью, стоматологом, охраной в Серебряном бору и другими абонентами вплоть до 2024 года.



Что касается сына главного «решалы», то он рос в «тепличных условиях» и не хватал звёзд с неба. Пока его отец не поставил «дела» с ФСБ на поток. В Сети сохранились анкеты Валерия Битаева младшего с сайтов знакомств. Он описывал себя, как мужчину обычного телосложения с каштановыми волосами и татуировками. «Валера» писал, что ищет девушку от 18 до 27 лет для дружбы и создания семьи. На фотографиях он позировал с рюмкой в руках: пристрастия молодости, по словам знакомых, увы, переросли в проблемы с алкоголем в зрелом возрасте.

До 2012 года Валерий Битаев младший числился в АО «Курорты Северного Кавказа», а когда у его отца дела пошли в гору, то он возглавлял «РТ-мединтегратор». Фирма занималась закупками томографов «Philips» для российских клиник. Таким образом Валерий Битаев стал работать с «Ростехом» (компания имела прямое отношение к госкорпорации) и лично с Сергеем Чемезовым, через его ставленника Андрея Шепилова.

Примерно в этот период сын главного решалы женился на Татьяне, в девичестве Бережной. Ей уже на тот момент было больше заявленных в анкете Валерия 27 лет, однако возраст и бэкграунд не стали помехой для брака.

Женщина работала в управлении обеспечения МИДа, потом в налоговой. Она была замужем за неким Василием Горбуновым, по всей видимости, человеком творческим. В разных источниках он фигурирует по-разному: то «Василий филармония», то «Василий продюсер», а в одном месте даже, как курьер популярной службы доставки. У них есть дочь, но Валерий Битаев принял Татьяну с ребёнком от первого брака, как своих, и даже дал обеим свою фамилию.

В последствии у Татьяны и Валерия появились общие дети, женщина кардинально изменила образ жизни. Она перестала работать, устроилась формально в компанию «Новые технологии», где ее муж и все их окружение до недавнего времени получали зарплату, а в подписках Битаевой исключительно «пластика», «Бали» и «18+».

Тимофей Гришин

Продолжение следует

Источник: www.rucriminal.info

How Mikhail Fridman became Boris Lyuboshits

The oligarch's attempt to attack Georgy Bedzhamov in England ended in failure

As the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info learned, by the decision of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Boris Moiseevich Lyuboshits, the owner of the micro-enterprise "Cesar Consulting", was recognized as "bad faith" and "a liar" in the case of financing lawsuits by Vneshprombank and the bankruptcy trustee Kireeva against Georgy Bedzhamov. The court also recognized Rustem Nuretdinov, Lyuboshits' lawyer, who is not registered as a lawyer in the Russian Federation, as well as Kireeva herself, as dishonest liars. The English court has dismissed Kireeva's claim against an Italian villa owned by Bedzhamov's civil partner, which both the manager and the Russian court had laid claim to. An appeal against this decision could, in theory, allow the case to continue, but would not change the court's basic conclusion that Lyuboshits, Nuretdinov and Kireeva were dishonest.



The severity of this offence in the context of English judicial decisions is best conveyed by the word "liar", rather than the softer and more streamlined "dishonest". "Dishonest" in the English legal tradition is not simply "dishonest conduct", but a deliberate misrepresentation, lying or concealment of the truth in order to deceive the court or another party.

Charges of deceiving the court are considered to be among the most serious in the context of UK civil proceedings. In exceptional cases, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, which hears commercial and property disputes, has the power to impose criminal penalties of up to 24 months' imprisonment for contempt of court, including wilful deception.

These hearings follow strict protocols that have remained unchanged for the past three centuries: participants are required to adhere to a formal dress code, and barristers appear in ceremonial silk robes and wigs. Trust in the participants in the process is considered the cornerstone of English justice, and an attempt to mislead the court is a grave breach of these principles.



In English legal proceedings, it is extremely rare and exceptional for a person to be found to be a liar and a dishonest participant without cross-examination. Judges, as a rule, exercise the utmost caution and do not draw such harsh conclusions without personally hearing the party and checking the credibility of their evidence. Therefore, the fact that the English court came to such conclusions without cross-examination demonstrates the flagrant and outrageous nature of the conduct. This means that the evidence presented was so strong and unambiguous that it left the court with no other choice. If the lie had been revealed during the in-person hearing, the court could have immediately issued an arrest warrant right in the courtroom and remanded the defendant in custody until sentencing. According to the source of Rucriminal.info, Lyuboshits got off lightly, given the nature of the conclusion made by the judges.



In 2024, Boris Lyuboshits bought the rights to prosecute Georgy Bedzhamov from A1, Alfa Group (Mikhail Fridman's structure) - at that time, these rights had already been sold to Alexander Fain. This deal raised suspicions of an attempt to circumvent the sanctions regime. The English court refused to trust either Fridman or Fain, and even more so Lyuboshits himself, who claimed through his lawyers that he was a wealthy investor willing to invest over $20 million in the prosecution of Bedzhamov. The court found this version unconvincing, in addition to the court rulings on deceiving the court.



Lyuboshits had previously figured in a corporate conflict around the inheritance of Andrey Trubnikov - the assets of the company Natura Siberica. For several months, he held the post of trustee of the business. At that time, representatives of the majority of the heirs of the company's founder accused him and his structure of attempting to seize control by force. Lyuboshits himself claimed that the management refused to provide documents necessary for the audit and due diligence. After his removal, his legal agency initiated a series of lawsuits against legal entities associated with Natura Siberica, but all of them were either rejected or left without consideration, which is confirmed by the data of the arbitration courts. Boris Luboshits also participated in organizing the sale of a Russian business to the German OBI GmbH for a symbolic sum of 1 euro.



After the deception of the English court was revealed, references to Boris Luboshits began to disappear from websites associated with him. The website of his micro-company Cesar Consulting (https://sezarconsult.ru/) became unavailable. The website of the company registered to his son, Audit Group (https://auditgr.ru/), remains accessible for now, but all references to Luboshits as the "founder" have been removed from it.



Archived versions of the websites are still available:



- Cesar Consulting: https://web.archive.org/web/20250125030222/https://sezarconsult.ru/#b2618



- Audit Group: https://web.archive.org/web/202405021

24541/https://www.auditgr.ru/



Lyuboshits' name is also no longer displayed on the SOLOMON.help website, an organization affiliated with the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia and supported by Mikhail Fridman and Alfa Group structures through the Solomon Foundation for the Support of Jewish Traditions and Culture. The SOLOMON.help website opens today with a photo of Mikhail Fridman, a leading shareholder in Alfa Group: https://solomon.help/. Earlier on this same website, Boris Lyuboshits was listed as a "Mentor" along with representatives of Alfa Group, including, for example, Andrei Elinson, until recently the managing partner of A1 Alfa Group, and now claiming to be the founder of the "independent" investment firm Inweasta with billions of dollars under management in Dubai.

Lyuboshits can be seen in the archived version of the Solomon.help website:



Boris Moiseevich Lyuboshits - brief information



Auditor and entrepreneur Boris Moiseevich Lyuboshits positions himself as a motivational speaker, public figure and business guru. Lyuboshits, the owner of the micro-enterprise "Cesar Consulting", called himself the founder and chairman of the board of directors of the company "Audit Group", which he presents as one of the top 10 largest audit groups and companies in the field of tax consulting.



In his Facebook and Instagram accounts, Boris Lyuboshits actively creates the image of an involved participant in public and professional life, periodically mentioning his participation in various councils and committees - such as the "Expert Council" of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, the "Investment Policy Council" under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the "Public Council" of the Federal Treasury and other similar structures, membership in which he indicates.



Lyuboshits is also listed as the founder of the online school "ERA", which promises free lessons in mathematics, physics, computer science and economics for schoolchildren.



In interviews and at his seminars, Lyuboshits often talks about "perfectionism", "values" and overcoming "internal barriers". He regularly appears as a "lecturer" and organizer of "master classes", where he shares what he calls "experience and knowledge", actively promoting himself through social networks and participation in events, including meetings at the Maryina Roshcha synagogue near Moscow.



Boris Lyuboshits publishes information about his activities and motivational initiatives on social networks: Instagram - https://www.instagram.com/borisliuboshits/, Facebook company - https://www.facebook.com/AuditGr/.



Extracts from judgments



Key Findings on Dishonesty and Bad Faith

Key Findings on Lying, Mendacity and Abuse of Process



1. "The certificate was false in a very material, if not crucial, respect... Mr Lyuboshits and Mr Nurtdinov must have known that the certificate... could not be provided... I consider that this document was not honestly provided."



[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 56]



2. "It is inconceivable that the bank did not tell them [Lyuboshits and Nurtdinov] that from the end of August it was not going to be possible [to transfer funds]." "It is inconceivable that the bank did not tell them [Lyuborshchits and Nurtdinov] that from the end of August transfers of funds were no longer possible."

[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 42]



3. "Knowing as they did that the certificate had to be provided, and knowing... that RB’s stance meant that moneys could not be paid directly... they must have known that the certificate could not be provided."

"Knowing as they did that the certificate had to be provided, and knowing... that RB’s stance meant that moneys could not be paid directly... they must have known that the certificate could not be provided." [2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 57]



4. "The certificate, and the reliance on it thereafter as preserving the proceedings, is in my view conduct falling within the broad description of Lord Diplock [abuse of process]."



[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 64]



5. "The funders, who were the part of the team most closely connected with the exercise, knew that it could not be provided, and yet it was. That in my view is a clear abuse."

"The funders who were closely involved in the process knew that the certificate could not be provided and yet it was provided anyway - this is in my view a patent lie and an abuse."

[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 64]



6. "I therefore find that the certificate in this case was not a valid or effective certificate, or alternatively that its provision and reliance on it is an abuse of process."

"an effective or efficient document or that its submission and reliance on it resulted from falsehood or abuse of process."

[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 67]



7. "Knowing as they did... they must either have told Mr Elliot of the difficulty (though I have not found that they actually did) or they deliberately withheld knowledge of the problem from Mr Elliot, making it impossible for him to certify truthfully."

"Knowing as they did... they must either have told Mr Elliot of the difficulty (though I have not found that they actually did) or they deliberately withheld knowledge of the problem from Mr Elliot, making it impossible for him to certify truthfully."

" [2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 57]



8. "Mr Nurtdinov himself has not apparently said anything about it. His silence is doubtless very significant."

[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024), [para 42]



9. "I have found that it was a certificate that was dishonest... The costs for the period since 31st August are directly attributable to that act of dishonesty... that is well ‘beyond the norm’ in terms of the test which has to be fulfilled for indemnity costs to be justified." "I have found that the certificate was a lie... The expenditure after 31 August is directly attributable to that lie... which is significantly outside the normal range."

[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024) (Costs Judgment), [para 5]



10. "The evidence overall now demonstrates that [Lyuboshits] was never likely to be [the true funder]... including some misleading statements about his interest in certain companies. I consider that this reflects a desire to hide something."

"The evidence overall now demonstrates that [Lyuboshits] was never likely to be [the true funder]... including some misleading statements about his interest in certain companies. I consider that this reflects a desire to hide something." [2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024) (Costs Judgment), [para 7]



11. "Since Mr Lyuboshits came on the scene this litigation has been presented on a false basis of the wealth of Mr Lyuboshits."



[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024) (Costs Judgment), [para 8]



12. "Various statements have been made on the claimant’s behalf by her solicitors from time to time about the source of the security monies which turn out to be either untrue or half-truths." "Various statements were made on behalf of the claimant by her solicitors about the origin of the security funds which turned out to be either false or half-true."

[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024) (Costs Judgment), [para 7]



13. "As I observed in my striking-out judgement, the falsity originated from someone who is closely associated with this litigation, someone who is said to be funding it and someone who benefits from the litigation, so it is appropriate that those acts, for these purposes, should be attributed to the claimant. She cannot distance herself from the costs certificate."



"As I observed in my striking-out judgment, the falsity originated from someone who is closely associated with this litigation, someone who is said to be funding it and someone who benefits from the litigation, so it is appropriate that those acts, for these purposes, should be attributed to the claimant. She cannot distance herself from the costs certificate."



"As I noted in my striking-out judgment, the falsity originated from someone who is closely associated with this litigation, someone who is said to be funding it and someone who benefits from the litigation, so it is appropriate that those acts, for these purposes, should be attributed to the claimant. She cannot distance herself from the false expenses certificate."

[2024] EWHC 2705 (Ch) (Mann J, 21 October 2024) (Costs Judgment), [para 5]



Arseniy Dronov



To be continued....

Source: www.rucriminal.info