Manturov: “If you can’t shut his mouth, then we’ll sew him up”

How the new Deputy Prime Minister helped Chemezov - $5 million or “you will sit until you learn to respect”

In the dizzying career of Denis Manturov, approved by the State Duma as First Deputy Prime Minister, there is one unpleasant moment, about which, on the one hand, everyone seems to know, but on the other hand, for some reason it is not customary to remember. VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info decided to recall how, as Deputy Minister of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation in 2007, he wanted to gain control over the NPO Saturn plant (now UEC-Saturn) in the Yaroslavl region. In the 2000s, the company, together with the French Snecma, was developing the SaM146 engine, which was subsequently equipped with Sukhoi Superjet 100 passenger aircraft. Details in our new investigation.

As our source said, it all started in 2006, when three months before the signing of an agreement on the creation of a joint venture in Rybinsk, NPO Saturn with the American corporation General Electric, Russian Technologies (now Rostec) demanded that the general director of Saturn » Yuri Lastochkin $5 million, “otherwise the plant will not be built.” Since its founding in 2007, Rostec has been led by Manturov’s closest associate, Sergei Chemezov.



In 2007, Lastochkin began to receive proposals from a group of comrades, headed by Manturov, to sell a controlling stake in the enterprise. These negotiations lasted more than a year and a half and failed because the comrades wanted to receive the plant as a gift. By mid-2008, Saturn's capitalization reached about $900 million, and the controlling stake was worth more than half of this amount.

Having failed to agree on the sale of the enterprise, potential buyers took decisive action. In the summer of 2008, a “landing party” of senior economic security officers of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and tax inspectors landed on the Saturn, and state banks revoked loans from the enterprise in the amount of up to 20 billion rubles. As a result of tax audits, an arrears of more than 1 billion rubles was discovered, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs opened four criminal cases.

According to a source from Rucriminal.info, a group of colonels gave the management of the enterprise an ultimatum: “If you don’t give up the plant, you will be imprisoned.” The officers in Rybinsk were served by Major Ivan Repin, who was responsible for barbecues, strong drinks, trips to the shore and other entertainment events. Subsequently, Repin headed the anti-corruption department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Yaroslavl region (in 2017 he submitted his resignation).

In December 2008, Vladimir Putin, who was then Prime Minister, came to NPO Saturn. During the visit, he harshly reprimanded Manturov and the then Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko, who told the prime minister that everything at the plant was allegedly stolen. In addition, the Prime Minister recommended the head of Russian Technologies, Sergei Chemezov, to stop criminal prosecution of Saturn management.

During the visit, Putin announced the transfer of Saturn to the ownership of Oboronprom, which is part of Russian Technologies. The state was helped to gain control over the plant by the crisis, as a result of which Saturn had serious financial problems. Lastochkin made the deal after the prime minister called.

In July 2009, the then governor of the Yaroslavl region Sergei Vakhrukov (now deputy secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation) invited Lastochkin to head Rybinsk. One of the arguments was that Manturov hated Lastochkin.



On May 29, 2012, Lastochkin’s article “How to save Superjet” was published in the Vedomosti newspaper. In it, the author announced the failure of the original business plan for creating the Sukhoi Superjet 100 and spoke about the contradictions “between the capabilities of the United Aircraft Corporation, the Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Company (SCAC) and the tasks that they are forced to solve.” As an interlocutor told Rucriminal.info, after that publication, Manturov, appointed head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade a week earlier, called the governor of the Yaroslavl region Sergei Yastrebov and warned: “If you cannot shut his mouth, then we will sew him up.”

In July 2013, a criminal case was opened against Lastochkin under Part 1 of Art. 201 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“abuse of authority”) on the sale of water treatment facilities to Saturn in 2009. Subsequently, the case of abuse of power was reclassified under Part 4 of Art. 160 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“embezzlement on an especially large scale”). This was done due to the fact that the injured party (NPO Saturn) never received a statement to initiate a criminal case. In addition, the statute of limitations of the previous article had expired.

Subsequently, in the pre-trial detention center, Lastochkin was reminded of his refusal to pay $5 million for the creation of a joint venture with the Americans. “They came to me and said: “Remember, you sent them then? You will sit until you learn to respect them,” he recalled during his last word in his criminal case in 2015. In 2022, the ex-head of Saturn was released.



Alexey Tokarev

Source: www.rucriminal.info

Viceroy of the Patrushev clan on Russian grain

Previously, Zernin served the interests of Sechin and Chemezov



Last week, Eduard Zernin, Chairman of the Board of the Union of Grain Exporters, gave an interview in which he said that Russia’s share in the world grain market will exceed 25%. Zernin is clearly trying to pass off wishful thinking, because, according to the VChK-OGU telegram channel, https://t.me/vchkogpu/47323 there is an unhealthy situation in the Russian exporters’ market.

The main importers of grain from Russia are Türkiye, Iran and Egypt. They account for more than 70% of all Russian exports. The Union of Grain Exporters is a non-governmental and non-profit organization, however, Russian companies participating in tenders for the supply of grain, on the instructions of Eduard Zernin, are forced to set unfavorable prices for themselves, which is why they lose to other participants. There are problems in the Russian market as well. Details at Rucriminal.info



According to the VChK-OGU, https://t.me/vchkogpu/47323 Zernin can act on the instructions of the Deputy Head of the Ministry of Agriculture Oksana Lut, who is the person of the head of the department Dmitry Patrushev, the son of the Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. It is not surprising that large Russian exporters obediently carry out the will of Eduard Zernin. They clearly cannot compete with the Patrushev family. Previously, the head of the Ministry of Agriculture and his deputy from 2010 to 2018 worked together at Rosselkhozbank, which lends to agricultural enterprises. Now Dmitry Patrushev is the head of the bank’s supervisory board.

The Union of Grain Exporters was created in 2019. That year, the redistribution of the Russian grain market began. In February, FSB and Federal Tax Service officers conducted searches at more than two dozen market participants, including such giants as Rusagro and Cherkizovo. Since then they have been considered the “court” companies of the Patrushevs.

The former deputy head of the United Grain Company, then under the control of VTB, Eduard Zernin became the executive director of the Union in May, and in 2020 he took the post of chairman of the organization’s board.

Oksana Lut, before joining Rosselkhozbank, worked for VTB for a long time, and also held the position of head of the non-core assets service of the department of investment projects of the Rostec corporation under Sergei Chemezov. Eduard Zernin in 2006-2007 was the General Director of the Corporate Center of OJSC AvtoVAZ, which was then under the control of Rostec.

In the Samara region, considered the patrimony of Sergei Chemezov, the Bio-Ton agricultural holding was registered in 2004, now owned by Eduard Zernin. The company is a member of the Union of Grain Exporters, but is not even among the top ten suppliers to the world market. In 2023, Bio-Ton received revenue of 11 billion rubles. and profit of 1.6 billion rubles. Zernin owns 99% of the agricultural holding, another 1% belongs to the general director Irina Logacheva, who, most likely, pulls the burden of the enterprise for the owner while he gives instructions to Russian grain exporters.

Eduard Zernin headed the board of directors of Bio-Ton Company LLC in 2011, and became the owner of the company only in 2020. Until that time, it belonged first to Natalya Martynova, and then to Vladimir Kirillov, who may have been associated with Rostec.

Until 2021, Kirillov was the founder of the non-profit organization ANO TsPPBP “Businessstatus”, which from 2016 to 2021 controlled Arena Crystal JSC. Its director Ekaterina Lokhova from 2016 to 2020 led JSC Centraviamed, part of Rostec. This leads to the assumption that Vladimir Kirillov could act in the interests of Chemezov’s corporation, and then transferred the Bio-Ton asset to Eduard Zernin.

After this, the chairman of the board of the Union of Exporters began acquiring new agricultural enterprises - Klyuch-Agro in the Volgograd region, Varyag in the Saratov region. The purchase prices were probably favorable, given the patronage of Sergei Chemezov and his long-time business partner, Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov.

Zernin amazingly knows how to find a common language with President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. Previously, together with Sergei Sudarikov, he was a co-founder of the Region Investment Company, acting in the interests of the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, collected 0.5 hectares of land for Sergei Chemezov, and is now dancing to the tune of Oksana Lut, representing the interests of the Patrushev family. How Zernin manages to be nice to everyone is beyond comprehension.

The leaders in grain exports at the beginning of this year were Green Gates, RIF, Aston, MZK-Export and the state-owned United Grain Company. Perhaps Eduard Zernin and Oksana Lut are acting in the interests of Grain Greats, which was created only in July 2022. Its success in such a short time is surprising. In 2023, the company received revenue of 242 billion rubles. and profit of 945 million rubles.

The founder of Grain Greats LLC is Valiansia JSC with 1 employee. From August 2022 to May 2023, it controlled Demetra-Holding LLC, one of the largest grain traders. In July last year, VTB sold its stake in Demetra Holding. Her former manager Ilya Aliyev heads Grain Gray LLC yts" since June 2022 and owns a 2% stake in the company. Behind it may be VTB, which is under sanctions and therefore does not want to shine. According to media reports, assets previously owned by the bank - the Novorossiysk grain terminal, a share in the Novorossiysk bakery plant, the grain carrier Rusagrotrans - are now owned by Ilya Aliyev.

Demetra-Holding, like Grain Greats, is a member of the Union of Grain Exporters. Its head, Eduard Zernin, having high patrons, tells exporters who to trade with and at what prices. Quotas for grain exports are distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture. Already in February 2023, Grain Greats, created in August 2022, with 3.2 million tons, was in second place after the RIF Trade House as the largest exporter. Based on the results of the first half of the season (July-December 2023), Aliyev’s company shipped 6.1 million tons and took first place.

The career of Eduard Zernin is an example that you can serve not even two masters, but three or four, considering VTB. So far Zernin is succeeding.



Roman Trushkin

Source: www.rucriminal.info

Chemezov's girlfriend and the war of the Lubyanka towers

How officials and security forces “came to blows” over a corrupt common fund



The Khamovnichesky Court of the capital rendered a verdict in the criminal case of the former director for legal support and corporate governance of Rostec, Alla Laletina. According to investigators, a close friend of Sergei Chemezov received monthly kickbacks in the amount of 6 million rubles. from the General Director of JSC Novosibirsk Artificial Fiber Plant (NZIV) Rustam Izmailov. The cooperation, according to investigators, brought Ms. Laletina, who promised general patronage, as well as financing for the modernization of the enterprise that produces missile warheads for the Iskander complexes and rockets for multiple launch rocket systems, about 70 million rubles. In addition, at the expense of the enterprise, she was paid for a long vacation in Turkey and various goods. According to the verdict, Laletina received eight years in prison and will also pay a fine equal to twice the amount of bribes she received.



A source from the VChK-OGPU telegram channel said that many similar episodes surfaced during the investigation. For example, one of the structures that belonged to the family of Deputy Mayor of Moscow Maxim Liksutov (probably it would be more correct to say the former family, since he fictitiously divorced his wife) allocated money for Laletina’s luxurious life - paid for the services of cosmetologists, hairdressers, the purchase of clothes, and even servants and a gardener who worked in her mansion near Moscow. In exchange, another structure controlled by the Liksutovs received very lucrative contracts through Rostec.

There were other benefactors. Since Laletina was at one time extremely close to Sergei Chemezov, a real battle unfolded around these episodes.



A source from the Cheka-OGPU said that the resignation of ICR investigator Rustam Gabdulin, who is now a successful lawyer, occurred precisely because of the case against the former director of legal support and corporate governance of Rostec, Alla Laletina. Gabdulin found himself at the epicenter of the battles of the two Lubyanka towers, which became one of the reasons to leave the TFR.



In the spring of 2021, a new case was opened against Laletina, who was under house arrest, this time for accepting a bribe. The case was brought by Gabdulin, who went to the Basmanny Court with a petition to change Laletina’s preventive measure to detention. She was charged with accepting bribes from Rustam Izmailov, general director of the defense Novosibirsk Artificial Fiber Plant (NZIV), part of Rostec.



According to the source, during the further investigation, many more similar episodes surfaced, including those related to the family of Maxim Liksutov

As a result, one Lubyanka tower believed that all episodes should be completed and presented to Laletina. Gabdulin also adhered to this strategy.

And the other Lubyanka tower categorically insisted that the matter was far-fetched and that work on the already existing episode should be curtailed. Moreover, the bribe-giver Izmailov is ready to refuse testimony.

The battle of the towers was and is very fierce. Gabdulin, who had previously thought about leaving, chose to bring this step closer.

Rucriminal.info will introduce readers to a unique document - a court decision, which describes the beginning of the “war” between two members of a once powerful corruption clan, overgrown with assets (withdrawn from the budget for hundreds of millions of dollars). They literally quarreled over a “trifle.” The banker, now former Deputy Minister of Economic Development, Pyotr Zaselsky, built schemes according to which government funds received through Rosatom and Rostec were successfully “saved.” Rostec top manager Alla Laletina was also a participant in these schemes. The “holder” of the common fund from the stolen funds was the brother of Zaselsky’s wife, Denis Mikhailov. He invested hundreds of millions of dollars in real estate in the USA, Monaco, Russia, in the purchase of antiques at Sotheby's auction, etc.

In 2017, Laletina got tired of hiding her real wealth behind Mikhailov’s back (at that time many officials stopped being shy and afraid and began to come out of the shadows) and asked to sign the cottage on Rublyovka to her. On paper alone, its value was $6.2 million. The house was registered to Tatyana Zaselskaya (wife of Pyotr Zaselsky and sister of Denis Mikhailov). And then suddenly something came over Mikhailov. What was found is, in principle, clear. By that time he was living like an Arab sheikh. His wife was the socialite Nadezhda Obolentseva, he spent most of his time in Monaco in the company of millionaires, rode on yachts, and swam in luxury. He no longer considered himself a figurehead, but one of the leaders of this corrupt group, along with everyone else. And so he starts a real and ugly scandal with Laletina over several bottles of wine. “The obedient, narrow-minded, but his own Den suddenly showed a grin and attacked Laletina because of a couple of cheap missing bottles of wine in a house on Rublyovka re-registered to Laletina,” said a source familiar with the situation.





Mikhailov claimed that several bottles of his collection wine and consumer goods were stored in this house. al give them away. Laletina sent him. But the parties did not rest on this. Mikhailov accused Laletina of selling this wine for 50 thousand dollars. Pyotr Zaselsky avoided this situation, as he found himself between two fires. He did it in vain. An angry Laletina announced her withdrawal from the common fund and demanded that her assets be transferred to trusted persons. At this point, Mikhailov announced that these were all his assets and had already sent them. Laletina set the security forces against Mikhailov, and criminal cases appeared. Zaselsky sided with the custodian of the common fund and also began to attack Laletina through the security forces. This is also why she ended up sitting down.





Timofey Grishin

Source: www.rucriminal.info

How Chemezov Airlines avoided the dues for the purchase of the Sukhoi Superjet

“From a relative of Yuri Slyusar, I was aware of the technical “capabilities” of the aircraft”




Russian channels rejoice with stories about the "new" civilian short-haul aircraft Sukhoi Superjet SJ 100, which was put into serial operation in 2011. The "new" Superjet is allegedly different from its predecessors with domestic engines, avionics and other equipment.

According to various sources, since 2011, more than 200 aircraft have been produced at an average price of 35 million dollars per copy, of which more than 75 percent go to foreign countries. Here Rucriminal.info will remind you how this project appeared for the domestic sky. Twenty years ago, in 2003, a paper sketch of the Superjet unexpectedly won the Rosavikosmos tender against the Tu 414, which was already ready for production, the drawings of which were transferred to the aviation plant in Kazan for the start of mass production. The not yet created aircraft took up over the ready-made Tu with a strange wording - "because of better export prospects and the availability of extra-budgetary funding." Then the main current lobbyists for the new Superjet, in addition to the head of the design bureau, Sukhoi Ponosyan, were the head of Rosaviakosmos, Yuri Koptev, and the deputy chairman of the Russian government, Boris Aleshin, who oversaw the aircraft industry. It was these two figures that doomed the Russian Federation to a long-term quitrent of the treasury in favor of supporting foreign manufacturers and the Aleshin clan's own pocket - Koptev. For 414 Tu, it was necessary to allocate about 4 billion rubles and put it into production, and since 2004 it would be able to carry the first passengers and would cost about $ 20 million per copy against 34 for Suererzhdet, by the way, the direct competitor of the SJ 100, the Brazilian Embraer E - Jet costs from 20 to 30 million dollars apiece, depending on the configuration, i.e., much cheaper than the "promising" Superjet for export. Off-budget funding turned out to be the opposite of billions from the state treasury - about 200 billion rubles Russia spent on a new project, billions left and settled in the pockets of the Aleshin-Koptev clan, instead of investing 4 billion in an already finished aircraft. All this was accompanied by serious aviation accidents in the preparation of the Superjet for the series - several air crashes that claimed human lives. As a result, the mountain gave birth to a mouse, in 11 the aircraft, raw and not ready for operation in Russia, went into production. Domestic airlines forced and force to buy it, for many years the Superjet has shown itself to be an extremely unreliable airliner, attempts to sell and operate it abroad have failed. In Russia, only one domestic airline was able to avoid the oblige to purchase a Superjet by opting for the Brazilian Embraer - this is S7 (Siberia), whose shadow owner is Sergey Chemezov and who, thanks to his protege and close relative Yuri Slyusar, is well aware of the technical capabilities of the Superjet.

It was Yury Slyusar, the general director of the UAC, who today received a report on the flight of the “new” airliner, in his eyes one could read the envy of the Koptev and Aleshin clans, what a walrus they were able to raise from each Superjet (from 5 to 10 million dollars) not counting the years of its development. They, St. Petersburg, Chemezovsky and Petrozavodsk, can only dream of such successes. The novelty of the liner also lies in the fact that it will finally meet the terms of reference and the needs of airlines, the parameters that were set 20 years ago. Design bureaus, production facilities were killed, invaluable personnel were lost, but we have a “new” aircraft, for which taxpayers pay not only with the ruble, but also with their lives. And the clan of Koptev and Alyoshin continue to withdraw billions of dollars abroad.

Timofey Zabiyakin

To be continued

Source: www.rucriminal.info

Who threw the billionaire Zelenov off the ladder?

"Putin's Ice Palace", the Chemezov family and Alisher Usmanov




The Telegram channel of the Cheka-OGPU conducted its own investigation into the mysterious death in France of the founder of the once largest developer Don-Stroy, Dmitry Zelenov. The documents found at the channel, as well as the stories of sources, made it possible to reveal a simply fantastic story that was before the tragedy. Zelenov did not retire, but was engaged in the construction of a personal project of the head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, and it was built with the money of Alisher Usmanov. Then two rich and extremely influential people decided that Zelenov “threw” them for 1 billion rubles, setting the security forces, tax authorities, etc. on him. Zelenov returned only 200 million rubles, he refused to pay the rest. In the field of this, he allegedly accidentally (without witnesses) fell down the stairs and received an injury incompatible with life. Rucriminal.info found out additional details of this story.



According to the documents that are at the disposal of the Cheka-OGPU, in recent years Zelenov has been focused on the project to build the Kristall ice sports palace in Luzhniki. The work was carried out by the Helios company belonging to him. The customer of this ambitious project is hidden behind many denominations and offshore companies. However, several sources said at once that this was a personal project of Sergei Chemezov, who himself controlled the progress of the work. The most modern and technically "fancy" hockey palace in Russia should appear. Thus Chemezov wants to make a "gift" to Vladimir Putin. Right next door in Luzhniki, Usmanov built the Rhythmic Gymnastics Palace, which is called the “Kabaeva Palace”. It is logical that "Putin's palace" will be located nearby.

The fact that "Crystal" is Chemezov's project is also confirmed by the documents at our disposal. With the help of cunning Helios agreements, gigantic sums were allocated for the project by the daughter and granddaughter of Rostec - Tyazhpromexport and the ANO of additional professional education Kalashnikov Fire Center. Also, with the help of loan agreements, the construction of the palace was financed by offshore Husky Enerprayzes (Belize), Loufareto Holdings Limited (Cyprus) and HC YueSeM LLC. The last structure belongs to Alisher Usmanov.

According to the documents that Rucriminal.info has at its disposal, the Putin Ice Palace project has become a family project for Chemezov. The customer for the construction of the Kristall Palace is Arena RT JSC. It is worth noting that in the name of many Rostec subsidiaries there are two letters “RT” at the end. But in this case, Rostec is not among the shareholders. The shareholders are Arena International LLC (89.8%) and Luzhniki Olympic Complex JSC (10.2%).

Arena International, in turn, is 100% owned by offshore company Lufareto Holdings Limited (Cyprus). for the activities of this empire, as well as other shadow offshore empires of Russian officials and oligarchs, Petr Brazhnikov is the founder of the law firm Brazhnikov & Partners Ltd (Cyprus).

The head of Arena RT, who has the right to act without a power of attorney, during the period of active implementation of the Crystal Palace project (from 2020 to 2022) was Ekaterina Vladimirovna Lokhova. This is a longtime member of the Chemezov-Ignatov family team, which the couple brings to asset management. In 2009, Ignatova created the Next beauty salon, the director of this company since December 2019 is Ekaterina Lokhova. She is also the director of JSC "Center for Aviation Medicine", which belongs to Rostec etc.

According to an informed source of the Cheka-OGPU, it was Usmanov who played a sad role in the fate of Zelenov. Somehow, in a friendly conversation with Chemezov, Usmanov found out how much had already been spent on the Kristall, which was still very far from being completed. After that, the oligarch exclaimed to Chemezov that he was being “fooled”, the entire “Kabaeva’s palace” cost Usmanov cheaper. Usmanov's structures are ready to take the project into their own hands and complete the "Putin's Palace" within the framework of the amounts already paid to Zelenov's "Helios".

Chemezov, according to the source, was extremely angry and soon Zelenov and his structures began to “shake” the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the Federal Tax Service, etc. Usmanov and his structures also joined in knocking out the allegedly “stolen” money. Personally, Zelenov was "counted" a debt of 1 billion rubles. According to our interlocutor, Zelenov returned 200 million rubles. However, he refused to pay further, especially since he settled in France. Putting him down was unrealistic. As a result, Zelenov "unsuccessfully fell."

The source says that the injuries on Zelenov's body indicate that he desperately resisted before falling ....









Timofey Grishin

Source: www.rucriminal.info

What hundreds of billions of Russian aviation industry have been spent on

“The Sukhoi Superjet fleet will stop after 10 years of operation”



In July 2019, at a meeting with the President of the Russian Federation, the head of Rostec, Chemezov, requested an additional 300 billion rubles for additional capitalization of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). According to Chemezov, "this amount is necessary to implement the MS_21 program, as well as other civil projects in the aircraft industry." Since that time, UAC has repeatedly received additional budget allocations for the revival of the fleet of domestic airliners, the creation and mass production of which was recklessly abandoned in the mid-10s (Prime Minister Medvedev, supervising Deputy Prime Minister Dvorkovich, head of Aeroflot Savelyev). How is the situation on the main programs today? Rucriminal.info publishes excerpts from an analytical note at the request of one of the leading structures in the field of national security.



Superjet

With great difficulty, the Irkut enterprise did not fully fulfill the supply of Superjets in 2020 and 2021, despite the fact that the Government of the Russian Federation actually wrote off 60 billion rubles of problem loans and provided 100% state support with financing the leasing of 60 aircraft in Russian airlines (Aeroflot , Red Wings, Azimuth). In 2022, it is planned to produce only 10 new Superjets, which is due to the lack of a sufficient number of imported components and does not correspond to the statement of Deputy Prime Minister Manturov about the production of 20 Superjets this year.

With great delays, the creation of an import-substituting Superjet New aircraft is underway. It is expected that a flying sample of the aircraft will appear after the completion of engine certification (2024-2025). At the moment, the first sample of the PD-14 engine is being tested at the stand. Typically, in an ideal test course, the bench period alone takes at least two years, plus two years in a flying laboratory. Thus, the certification of a new aircraft with a new engine will take place no earlier than 2027, otherwise it will be possible to say that the certification of the aircraft is under a reduced program, with a large number of restrictions. Some of these restrictions, for example, resource restrictions on the Superjet aircraft, have not been lifted so far. So, due to the destruction of the wing in 2019 with an operating time of only 15,000 cycles, the service life of the aircraft is limited to this value, which is more than 2.5 times less than the design value. In practice, this means that the existing Sukhoi Superjet fleet will stop after 10 years of operation. The airframe of the new Sukhoi Superjet New aircraft completely inherited this problem, so repeated life tests of the new airframe are planned.

The capacity of the plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur makes it possible to produce up to 40 aircraft per year, which is enough to saturate the domestic market, which is estimated at about 160-180 aircraft of this size. However, the key problem will be the supply of a sufficient number of engines and spare parts for them, manufactured by the Saturn plant, especially if there are problems with the reliability of the new hot part of the engine, as was the case with the SAM-146. The resource of the Russian version of the engine has not yet been confirmed, since key certification tests have not been completed. Repair of the hot part of the SAM-146 engine at the UEC enterprises has not yet been established, due to the lack of documentation from the French side. The situation is similar with the landing gear, APU and other key systems of the aircraft. It is possible to predict a complete shutdown of the Sukhoi Superjet aircraft fleet in terms of the exhaustion of the engine, landing gear and airframe life after 10 years of operation and 4 years in terms of engine life.



MS-21

The situation is slightly better with the MS-21 program, where the PD-14 engine has already received a type certificate and made its first flights on board the aircraft. However, here it is necessary to replace French-made electronic equipment, many American-made components and systems with Russian ones (about 50% of the cost of the aircraft), which will take at least three years. The UAC management assures that the delivery of the first 4 MS-21 aircraft is scheduled for 2023. However, to implement this task, it is necessary to build and certify the aircraft in a standard design with all Russian-made units. It will be necessary to make about 100-150 flights in various weather conditions. Thus, deliveries of the imported MC-21 aircraft can begin no earlier than in 2025, that is, 6 years later than the original plan.

The capacities for the production of the MS-21 aircraft in Irkutsk and Ulyanovsk (wing) are designed to produce 72 aircraft per year for the fifth year of production. The need for the domestic aircraft market is at least 900 aircraft. Possible export deliveries of about 200 pieces to closed markets (Cuba, Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea). Also, there is a problem of capacities for the production of new PD-14 engines in Perm, which are now designed to produce about 10 engines per year, and the decisions made in 2021 provide a transition to the production of 50 engines per year, which is completely insufficient.. Opti The minimum output for aircraft of this type would be the production of at least 120-150 aircraft per year and 300 engines. This requires the construction of a new assembly plant, for example, in Ulyanovsk and a new engine plant in Perm or in another city where UEC enterprises are located (Ufa, Rybinsk, Kazan, Samara).

APU and other key aircraft systems. It is possible to predict a complete shutdown of the Sukhoi Superjet aircraft fleet in terms of the exhaustion of the engine, landing gear and airframe life after 10 years of operation and 4 years in terms of engine life.



IL 96-400

Despite the fact that back in 2016, decisions were made to build 6 serial aircraft of this type and one prototype, in fact, the construction of one prototype aircraft was financed, which to date is not equipped with avionics and interior. The reason is that financial resources were redistributed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade to support the Superjet program.

As a result, Russia may be left without long-haul aircraft. To reach an acceptable production capacity of 15-20 aircraft per year, a complete reconstruction of VASO with a change in equipment and aircraft production technology is required. The technology for the production of IL-96 aircraft is currently very labor-intensive (there is no robotic riveting of the fuselage and wing, an outdated fuselage stack assembly, one wing assembly station, a slip line for the general assembly of the aircraft) and allows to produce, with the available labor resources at VASO (5300 people), not more than 2-3 Il-96 aircraft per year. The demand of the Russian market for wide-body long-haul aircraft is about 100 pieces. It is advisable to consider the development of a new aircraft based on the Il 96-400M with avionics, a pilot cabin from the MS 21 and two new PD-35 engines with a thrust of 38 tons. In this case, it will be necessary to increase the capacity of the Aerocomposite plant in Ulyanovsk several times. Perhaps, at the first stage, use the existing wing, the design of the late 80s, with subsequent replacement with a new wing. The IL-96-400 aircraft with a new wing and new PD-35 engines will fully cover the needs of the domestic market for passenger and cargo transportation and can be used as a platform for military purposes. In addition, export deliveries of up to 60 pieces are possible. to closed markets (Cuba, Iran. Syria, Libya, North Korea). At the same time, work should be accelerated on the certification of the Il-96-400M aircraft, the construction of a prototype of which should be completed in 2022, significantly simplifying its avionics, unifying it with the serial Il-96-300 aircraft. It is necessary to launch a series of 10 aircraft of this type, which can be built already in the period 2025-2027. By the end of 2027, it would be possible to complete work on the creation of the Il-96 NEW aircraft with PD-35 engines. A new assembly plant for this aircraft with a capacity of 20 aircraft per year can be built either on the territory of VASO or at the Aviastar plant.

In general, the situation with the serial production of aircraft at VASO is very difficult. Due to personnel reshuffling and poor management on the part of IL PJSC, the enterprise has not produced marketable products for 5 years now, and the aircraft are not handed over to customers. The plant needs a new product for serial production, and this could be the upgraded Il-96-400 with new PD-35 engines. These aircraft are needed as a strategic reserve for transport and passenger aviation, regardless of how the Russian-Chinese CR-929 aircraft will develop.



IL-114

All program deadlines have been cancelled. Design Bureau named after S.V. Ilyushin once again in March this year. approved a new TOR for the creation of an aircraft, with a new layout, which requires processing of already issued documentation.

The main problem of the Il-114 program is the poor design of the aircraft, which leads to inefficient use of the fuselage area (64 passenger seats versus 72 for the ATP-72 and 88 for the Bombardier-Q400) with approximately equal dimensions, unreliable TV7-117ST engines, forced up to 3000 l .With. with a very small resource (only 1000 hours, versus 7000 for competitors), the impossibility of using the aircraft on unpaved airfields due to the low clearance of the propeller (40 cm), as well as the unsuccessful design of the wing mechanization, which does not allow the flaps to be fully deflected (by 40 degrees), which increases the length of the run of the aircraft on the runway. The design of the aircraft is unreliable, out of less than 20 aircraft built, two crashed.

Due to the incompleteness of the design of aircraft in the standard design, no. In the current situation, given the overload of the S.V. Ilyushin Design Bureau with other projects, it seems appropriate to consider abandoning this program and focusing on other regional aircraft that are more adapted to the requirements of the Russian market. Thus, the need for regional aircraft with a capacity of 60-100 seats for operation on concrete airfields can be covered by the Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft, and the need for regional aircraft with a capacity of 40-50 seats for operation at unpaved airfields can be covered by the TVRS-44 aircraft. The released financial and The personnel resources of PJSC IL can be directed to the development of the Il-96-400 long-range aircraft with PD-35 engines and the creation of a production base for it, as well as to the development of the Il-112 and Il-76 aircraft. Savings can amount to 30 billion rubles .



Tu-214 (Tu-204)

Serial production reached its peak in 2006-2008, when, by order of IFC, the Aviastar SP plant (Ulyanovsk) produced 10 Tu-204 aircraft per year. Since then, output has been falling. Since 2012, the Aviastar SP plant switched to the production of Il-76 aircraft, one of the Tu-204 aircraft assembly lines was dismantled and an Il-76 assembly line was built in its place. The second assembly line was also partially dismantled, so that the full-fledged production of Tu-204 aircraft is now impossible at this enterprise.

Over the years, the KAPO enterprise (Kazan) produced one or two Tu-214 aircraft per year for state customers on one production line. Considering that the enterprise's labor resources are limited, and the Tu-214 production technology is very labor-intensive, the probability of increasing the annual production of Tu-214 aircraft beyond 3 aircraft per year without prejudice to the main program is extremely small.

It seems appropriate to restore the airworthiness of all Tu-214s (3 aircraft) and Aviastar Tu (6 aircraft) previously produced and on the balance sheets of the IFC Tu-214 (3 aircraft) at the KAPO plant, Tu 204-100 and 204-300 (6 aircraft) at the Aviastar joint venture plant or entrust this work to UZGA Engineering. Also, it is necessary to order at least 10 new Tu-214 aircraft, which can be built in the period 2024-28. This type of aircraft can be used to transport passengers to the Far East.



Russian-Chinese CR-929

The program is at the stage of the 4th gate (gate 4) according to Boeing's terminology: preliminary design is completed, the main suppliers of components are being selected, the detailed design of the aircraft airframe and the production of prototype aircraft are beginning. The parties have begun manufacturing the structures of the prototype aircraft, in particular, the composite-metal fuselage of the aircraft in China and the composite wing in Russia. This is perplexing for industry experts, since the selection of main suppliers, in particular engines, has not yet been finalized.

In the first phase (2022-23), it was assumed that either Rolls-Royce or General Electric engines would be used. Subsequently (2027-2030), it was planned to equip the aircraft of this family with Russian and Chinese engines, which are at an early stage of prototype testing.

In 2021, the parties managed to overcome disagreements on intellectual property issues for the aircraft and certain technologies (composite wing and fuselage), which made it possible to start building prototypes.

For serial production of aircraft, the Russian side needs to make a decision on the construction of a new plant in the Far East, near the Chinese border, since the dimensions of the aircraft wing are such that they do not allow transportation by An-124 aircraft and by rail.

Under the sanctions, the Russian side insists on the maximum use of avionics, power supply systems, hydraulics, chassis, brakes, landing gear, Russian-made interiors, analogues of which have been developed for the imported version of the MS-21 since 2018. It is also obvious that it will be proposed to use Russian and Chinese engines for this aircraft, which will automatically shift the start of flight tests of the aircraft to 2026-2027.

The Chinese side proposes to use its counterparts from the COMAC-919 aircraft, but the likelihood of this decision is small, since most of these components are produced at joint ventures between China and firms from the US and the EU.

The announced deadlines for the first flight of the aircraft in 2023 are unlikely to be met. It can be assumed, based on the stage of readiness of Russian and Chinese engines, that the first flight will take place no earlier than 2026.

To be continued



Timofey Zabiyakin

Source: www.rucriminal.info