How they “saw” the warning system about a terrorist threat for Muscovites
Spectators of the Picnic concert, who came under a terrorist attack, consider the statements that all Crocus systems designed for emergency situations to have worked normally to be false. Here's what one of the victims told the VChK-OGPU telegram channel about this:
“Our seats were located directly in the passage between the stalls and the amphitheater. It was there that the terrorists came and opened fire. When the shots rang out in the hall, we jumped into the last row of the stalls on the floor and hid under the seats. They were shooting to our left. A woman was lying in front of me. From behind is a man covering the woman with his body. The fire went down our row and down the row to the left. We lay there for 10-15 minutes. Only 7-10 minutes after the shooting began, an audio notification came out that..... “the concert is canceled for technical reasons. Leave the premises immediately." At the same time, shooting was still going on in the hall. The message itself was disorienting for those in the room. Due to the shooting, the hall was filled with powder gases. But during this time the fire alarm did not go off. Not a drop of water fell, no instructions were given where to run. During interrogation, I will give appropriate testimony.”
Rucriminal.info understands how all warning systems currently work.
The warning systems created at different levels of civil defense and RSChS belong to different operators, many of which are actually unable to autonomously maintain their functionality. The current warning systems do not meet the basic requirements of warning - constant readiness and ensuring maximum coverage of the population in the shortest possible time, regardless of the time of day, location and residence. The warning system must respond instantly, have redundancy, backup and independent power sources, a reliable network that can be easily restored in the event of external damage, and also cover all available technologies for delivering the required signal.
The cost of a license to provide communication services for the purposes of wired broadcasting is a pittance, while the state body ROSKOMNADZOR, whose responsibilities include monitoring the licenses issued to it, does not carry out appropriate control.
The technical conditions are the simplest, using the example of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise RSVO (supplied by the Ministry of Digital Development), even they do not have to be fulfilled. It is possible to take a radio station signal (Radio Russia, Mayak) from the Internet online, hiding behind a letter from RTRS, which in fact is not a network connection agreement, without guaranteeing signal transmission. At the same time, through one of the supply lines, funds are annually transferred to the specified Federal State Unitary Enterprise, the purpose of which is to develop the warning network and maintain the network. The enterprise, on average, annually earns 4 billion rubles/year (population and organizations - 2 billion rubles/year, another +1.5 billion rubles/year in St. Petersburg, Sevastopol) and competently uses the budget, showing from year after year, paying positive dynamics to the budget, exactly 20-10 million rubles)))) The management of the enterprise does not actually hide the main goal of profit; if you google it, there are enough corruption scandals, resignations, etc. on this topic.
Adding fuel to the fire is the internal struggle of the previous and current management for the cash register, the old team I.O. Shchegolev, O.G. Dukhovnitsky, I.N. Chursin, A.N. Vasilyev, etc., the new team - D.V. Kim ., Ugnivenko D.K., Proskura D.V.
As for Moscow, the entire real budget for the cities is not in the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for Moscow (which “puff out their cheeks” and conduct training and donate vehicles to the units), but in the hands of the Department of Civil Defense and Emergency Safety (Go and ChSPB) (Be puzzled and study the information of these three government agencies, the responsibility between them is blurred and blurry for a reason).
Among the special achievements over the past decades are “advanced technologies” SMS notifications and the KUZF, RATSCO (OSO) networks, which have three modes:
- doesn’t work (they build, rent out and shut down), the city, of course, continues to spend money.....
- it works accidentally, we explain it as an unscheduled check;
- works where necessary to demonstrate the funds spent;
Modern technologies, only with the change of the Minister of Emergency Situations, were taken out of the back drawer of the table, and now they are spending time developing the concept of notification using cell-broadcast technology. It’s not customary to rush, soon the “fuse” will pass and everything will fall into its “prayed” places of the “stability 20+” period, but while people known to each other get used to it, you can skim off the cream, twice, three times... such a carousel of money in nature.
Huge sums are spent after a UAV attack on Moscow, Moscow City. But this is only a drop, the funds spent are tens of times more, the simplest trick is to place the purchase on behalf of the Moscow Department of Competition Policy, and not from the State Emergency Service. Well, all purchases are planned in advance for specific performers, such small legal entities, at the individual entrepreneur level, fully controlled and known in a narrow circle (Disider, Datrion, Lux Service, Mars Arsenal, etc.).
In the Moscow region, in comparison with Moscow, the situation is even more complicated: the lobby of the PIK Group, defibudget quotes, and at least 5 sub-departments and government agencies (Mingos administration, GUGZ, 112, Special Center Zvenigorod, Rostelecom, EMERCOM for Moscow Region and some others). Some of these institutions are located in the same building, on different floors, but do not interact with each other, only IBD and NIRAZPIL.
And also the widespread replacement of wires with LTE channels, using conventional solutions based on mobile network operators and household modems. It's cheaper that way. If the purchase specifies optical or feeder wires, then they are placed to the nearest box, and then LTE, which is jammed, works with voice priority over traffic, etc.
The Ministry of Emergency Situations is trying not to develop its own low-frequency network; its destiny is a completely divided market for fire safety equipment between a couple of manufacturers whose roots go back to the “children's world.”
The war has already lasted 2 years, Sobyanin periodically reports on downed UAVs, but there are no simple signs to the nearest bomb shelter on the streets, KUZF does not work, the population turns off radio points at a rate of 100-150 thousand per year, and new systems, which are mandatory, are required upon commissioning of the facility . Which can then be dismantled and installed at the next facility and so on….
Against the background of the simplest briefing on the plane - where is the oxygen mask, where is the emergency exit, etc... any room is in fact a place of death in an emergency, remember a lame horse, a wild cherry tree and the richest capital with CROCUS. And if you dig deeper, then all systems (fire, warning, etc.) are required to be supported by management companies, which in the case of the population and apartment buildings include them in the EAP article “Maintenance and repair of residential buildings + solid waste”, but this line is in the housing and communal services system has a double bottom, which feeds many, including migrant workers and their families abroad. I wonder why the department of GOiChSPB GM is under Biryukov’s housing and communal services?
Why Akimova Yu.N. was never replaced in his post? Why was the maintenance and operation of the Civil Defense and Emergency Situations console transferred to a private company that lobbies the interests of the OSO equipment manufacturer associated with it? Why are the systems not connected to each other? How many people should die? Why can’t you profit from functional systems and the absence of casualties during emergencies? Why is it that every time there is a shooting, a fire, an attack by a UAV or other emergencies, we learn about the victims from the TG, and not from the systems that the state is legally obligated to install? Why?
Alexey Ermakov
Source: www.rucriminal.info
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